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STAY-AT-HOME ORDERS 
Henry F. Fradella* 
To a large extent, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought the United 
States into uncharted territory on a number of fronts. Despite the fact that 
the steps the federal and state governments take to curtail the spread of 
the viral infection are presumably taken in the best interest of public 
health, governmental actions and actors must comply with the U.S. 
Constitution. Some public health measures, such as stay-at-home orders, 
restrict the exercise of personal freedoms ranging from the rights to travel 
and freely associate to the ability to gather in places of worship for 
religious services. Enforcement of these public health orders falls to 
police.  But police authority to stop and question people—even during a 
pandemic—must nonetheless comply with the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. Given the compelling governmental interest in limiting the 
spread of COVID-19, reasonable police actions to enforce public health 
orders are likely constitutional under several theories, even if stops are 
made without particularized suspicion. Of those, however, the special 
needs doctrine is best suited for this purpose because it is the approach 
most likely to safeguard civil liberties after the pandemic ends. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has only rarely addressed the extent to 
which the police power of the state outweighs individual rights and 
liberties in the context of governmental efforts to stop the spread of 
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infectious diseases. The most instructive case, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
dates back to the smallpox epidemic at the dawn of the twentieth century.1 
In overruling a pastor’s claim that a mandatory smallpox vaccination 
violated his constitutional rights, the Court carefully stated that individual 
liberties “may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected 
to [restraints] . . . by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general 
public may demand.”2 This precedent, now 115 years old, predates laws 
and judicial opinions aimed at maximizing religious freedoms under 
which the outcome in Jacobson might differ today.3 But whether religious 
freedoms may be significantly curtailed during a pandemic under public 
health orders designed to save human lives is not the only open question 
from a constitutional perspective. For example, to what degree does due 
process restrain the power of the state to quarantine people merely 
suspected of being infected with the disease?4 To what extent may the 
government conduct surveillance for “contact tracing” purposes (such as 
tracking movements via cell phones) and, in doing so, invade people’s 
privacy?5 Does the power of eminent domain allow the government to 
seize private facilities for quarantine purposes and, if so, must 
compensation be provided?6 And, most relevant to this Article, to what 
extent does the Fourth Amendment restrain the power of law enforcement 
to stop people who are out of their homes when a public health order has 
directed people to shelter-in-place during a pandemic? 
1. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
2. Id. at 29. 
3. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1493 (2020); FLA. STAT. ch. 761.01-.05 (2020); see also 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (invalidating an 
ordinance banning animal sacrifice as part of religious ceremonies on the grounds that the law targeted 
practitioners of Santeria); Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that because a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability, states may prohibit 
sacramental peyote use and, accordingly, may also deny unemployment benefits to persons who were 
fired for such use); cf. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106–
274, § 2, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.). 
4. For an analysis, see Michael R. Ulrich & Wendy K. Mariner, Quarantine and the Federal 
Role in Epidemics, 71 SMU L. REV. 391 (2018) 
5. See Simon Chandler, Coronavirus Could Infect Privacy and Civil Liberties Forever, 
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonchandler/2020/03/23/coronavirus-
could-infect-privacy-and-civil-liberties-forever/#71aa2b64365d [https://perma.cc/DFU5-9X6F]. 
6. David G. Tucker & Alfred O. Bragg, III, Florida’s Law of Storms: Emergency
Management, Local Government, and the Police Power, 30 STETSON L. REV. 837 (2001). 
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I. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR PUBLIC HEALTH ORDERS 
The Commerce Clause grants the federal government limited legal 
authority to take measures to prevent the spread of diseases from foreign 
countries and between states.7 Pursuant to that constitutional provision, 
Congress enacted the Public Health Service Act in 1944.8 The U.S. 
Department of Health and Humans Services, which houses the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), has enacted, and periodically 
amended, various regulations under the authority of that legislation.9 
Collectively, these federal laws permit the U.S. government to issue 
isolation and quarantine orders to persons arriving in the United States 
and traveling between states.10 Thus, federal authority is somewhat 
limited in this arena.11 By contrast, the police powers of the states—the 
authority to impose restrictions on private rights for the sake of public 
welfare, order, and security which is enshrined in state constitutions under 
the authority reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution—vests primary authority to state and local governments to 
order people into isolation or quarantine for public health purposes.12 
Although state laws governing the exercise of police powers for 
health emergencies vary significantly,13 most states’ laws vest public 
health directors or similar officials the authority to issue public health 
orders designed to stop the spread of contagious diseases. But these orders 
are allowed only under limited circumstances that not only involve certain 
types of danger to the public health, but also that could not be controlled 
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL33201 
FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION AUTHORITY 1 (2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33201.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMD7-3XRF]. 
8. Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, § 361, 58 Stat. 703 (1944) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 264–72). 
9. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 70–71 (2020). 
10. Isolation “separates sick people with a quarantinable communicable disease from people
who are not sick,” whereas quarantine “separates and restricts the movement of people who were 
exposed to a contagious disease to see if they become sick.” Legal Authorities for Isolation and 
Quarantine, CDC.GOV (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/
aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html [https://perma.cc/R4ZS-AYL4].  
11. COLE, supra note 7, at 6 (“While the federal government has authority to authorize
quarantine and isolation under certain circumstances, the primary authority for quarantine and 
isolation exists at the state level as an exercise of the state’s police power.”) 
12. Id.; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Lawrence O. Gostin, The 
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 
13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 24 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has made clear that states have a deep 
reservoir of public health powers, conceiving of state police powers as an ‘immense mass of 
legislation in which inspection laws, quarantine laws, and health laws of every description . . . are 
components of this mass’”) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. at 203 (internal alterations omitted)). 
13. COLE, supra note 7, at 6. 
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through less restrictive alternatives.14 Stay-at-home orders and shelter-in-
place orders (SaHOs/SiPOs) can be considered as variations of state 
isolation and quarantine authority to stop the spread of disease. 
Alternatively, SaHOs/SiPOs may be viewed as stemming from broader 
executive powers during emergencies,15 especially in the more than forty 
states that have adopted some variation of the Model State Emergency 
Health Powers Act, drafted by the CDC in 2001 after the September 11th 
attacks.16 Either way, the “en masse” lockdowns attendant to 
SaHOs/SiPOs impinge on so many constitutional rights that they will 
likely be challenged on a variety of grounds, although most experts agree 
most such challenges will fail.17 
State laws provide either civil or criminal punishments for violation 
of public health orders that range from fines to terms of imprisonment.18 
Most jurisdictions, however, use criminal penalties only as a last resort. 
As a spokesperson for the San Francisco Police Department states, “We 
are not interested in using a criminal justice approach for a public health 
challenge. . . . This is about educating the public about voluntary 
compliance.”19 As Houston Police Chief Art Acevedo noted, police 
departments across the United States have largely been taking a similar 
approach because it is essential that police–community relationships be 
14. Nat’l Conf. of State Leg, State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes (2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/BZ22-M8XH] [hereinafter “NCSL, Quarantine Statutes”]. 
15. For example, the emergency management statute in Tennessee grants the governor the
authority to suspend state business; order evacuations; set quarantine areas; limit the sale of certain 
goods; use the national guard to distribute “supplies, equipment, and materials”; “commandeer . . . 
private property . . . necessary to cope with the emergency”; and “take measures concerning the 
conduct of civilians, the movement and cessation of movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic . . . 
[and] the calling of public meetings and gatherings . . . .” TENN. CODE § 58-2-107 (2020). 
16. For an in-depth discussion of that model statute by its primary author, see Gostin, supra 
note 12, passim. 
17. Arizona State University law professor James Hodge opined that in light of the broad
governmental authority during a public health crisis, such challenges would only succeed as applied 
to some “truly egregious practice.” Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawsuits over Coronavirus Quarantines 
Are Unlikely to Succeed, Experts Say. ABA J. (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/suits-over-coronavirus-quarantines-unlikely-to-succeed-
experts-say [https://perma.cc/P5QY-7PWM]. But Georgetown University law professor Lawrence 
Gostin cautioned that there are dramatic distinctions between isolation and quarantine of infected and 
suspected infected persons and widespread SaHOs/SiPOs. Id. 
18. NCSL, Quarantine Statutes, supra note 14. 
19. Betsy Pearl, Lea Hunter, Kenny Lo, Ed Chung, The Enforcement of COVID-19 Stay-at-
Home Orders, CNTR. AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/criminal-justice/news/2020/04/02/482558/enforcement-COVID-19-stay-home-orders/ 
[https://perma.cc/BH8M-D5QG]. 
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strong at this critical time.20 Nonetheless, when people flout 
SaHOs/SiPOs, police have little choice but to exercise their law 
enforcement authority. 
II. POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH ORDERS
Public health orders such as SaHOs/SiPOs are incredibly tricky to 
enforce. This is especially true in the United States during the COVID-19 
pandemic for two reasons. 
First and foremost, some jurisdictions have not issued legally-
binding orders to stay inside. Rather some state and local governments 
have issued guidelines that rely on the public’s voluntary cooperation.21 
In such locales, formal legal orders are not issued “unless a person breaks 
that initial request.”22 But even when legally-enforceable orders are in 
place, as professor of law and global health Polly Price explained, 
enforcement of these orders often falls on “the honor system.”23 
Second, public health officials cannot arrest people or force them to 
stay in a particular location. Thus, enforcing SaHOs/SiPOs falls to the 
police. Law enforcement around the globe struggle with how far they 
should go in enforcing such orders as applied to everyday, ordinary 
behaviors.24 Unlike in other countries where police can respond to 
emergency legislation that empowers them to enforce lockdown orders 
aggressively,25 in the United States, enforcement of public health orders 
is complicated by the Fourth Amendment since that constitutional 
provision limits police authority to stop, question, frisk, or arrest people 
absent certain quanta of proof.26 
20. Kevin Johnson & Richard Wolf, Enforcing the Shutdown: Law enforcement grapples with 
policing stay-at-home orders, social distancing, quarantines, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/02/coronavirus-police-fines-jail-breaking-
stay-home-orders/5104704002/ [https://perma.cc/JW98-LTZ2]. 
21. Talal Ansari & Brianna Abbott, U.S. Considers How to Enforce Coronavirus Quarantines, 




24. Damien Cave & Abdi Latif Dahir, How Far Should Police Go in Enforcing Coronavirus
Lockdowns? N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/world/australia/
coronavirus-police-lockdowns.html [https://perma.cc/AY6M-DGWB]. 
25. Id. 
26. See generally MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY F. FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK: THE USE AND 
ABUSE OF A CONTROVERSIAL POLICING TACTIC (2016). 
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III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures.27 
There is no formula for determining reasonableness; rather, reasonable-
ness is an inherently flexible standard that takes into account all of the 
circumstances surrounding the actions of law enforcement officials. 
Generally, though, absent abusive conduct or behavior that “shocks the 
conscience” . . . , the reasonableness of search or seizure will turn, in 
large part, on three factors: (1) whether law enforcement officers tres-
passed against a defendant’s property rights; (2) whether law enforce-
ment officers violated the defendant’s reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; and (3) whether the actions of law enforcement complied with the 
requirements of the Warrants Clause.28 
But the Supreme Court has recognized numerous exceptions to 
requirements of probable cause and warrants in the ground of the 
“reasonableness” of police actions, usually by “weighing the utility of a 
particular kind of search or seizure in serving some ‘special law 
enforcement interest’ against the degree of intrusiveness entailed in the 
particular technique.”29 
When people voluntarily consent to isolation, monitoring, and 
treatment, the usual strictures of the Fourth Amendment are not 
implicated.30 But when people do not comply with public health orders, 
or if there are bona-fide questions as to whether they are in compliance 
with the exceptions to such orders, police are called upon to act in ways 
that are designed to stop the spread of contagious diseases. In such 
circumstances, law enforcement officers may need to stop and question 
people in ways that would otherwise be impermissible under the Fourth 
Amendment—namely without any individualized suspicion as normally 
27. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
28. STEPHEN S. OWEN, HENRY F. FRADELLA, TOD W. BURKE, & JERRY JOPLIN, FOUNDATIONS 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 243 (3d ed. 2020) (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012) (holding that a search occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes when 
law enforcement physically intrude on a constitutionally protected area); Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that even in the absence of a physical trespass, a search occurs for 
Fourth Amendment purposes when law enforcement violates a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that police conduct that “shocks 
the conscience” violates due process). 
29. Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1648 (1998). 
30. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (noting that the prohibition on
warrantless searches and seizures does not apply “to situations in which voluntary consent has been 
obtained”). 
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required for police stops.31 Given the compelling governmental interest in 
limiting the spread of COVID-19, reasonable police actions to enforce 
SaHOs/SiPOs are likely constitutional under several theories, but several 
of these approaches might expand police authority in ways that have the 
potential to encroach on civil liberties after the pandemic ends. 
A. Terry and Reasonable Suspicion in Light of Asymptomatic Persons 
Although probable cause is usually necessary to conduct a search, 
seize evidence, or make an arrest, the Supreme Court has created several 
notable exceptions to this rule. The one most relevant to the enforcement 
of SaHOs/SiPOs allows police to stop people based on reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity—a lower standard of proof than probable 
cause.32 Stops are not the same as arrests; they are brief, limited 
investigative detentions that do not ordinarily involve any intention to 
arrest a person, whereas formal arrests require that law enforcement 
officers intend to take someone into custody.33 Still, to comply with the 
requirements of Terry v. Ohio, should law enforcement have reasonable 
suspicion that someone is violating a public health order before stopping 
them? 
Relying on various studies or statements from public health officials, 
news sources typically report that between 25% and 50% of people who 
contract COVID-19 are asymptomatic and, therefore, might have no idea 
that they are spreading the disease by being “out and about.”34 A review 
of twenty-one research reports conducted by The Centre for Evidence-
Based Medicine at Oxford University reported that although “between 5% 
and 80% of people testing positive” for COVID-19 may be asymptomatic, 
there is “not a single reliable study to determine the number of 
asymptotics.”35 
31. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (recognizing that warrantless stops may occur upon
reasonable, articulable suspicion); see also WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 26, at 43–79. 
32. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
33. E.g., Bartlett v. State, 249 S.W.3d 658, 668 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008); see generally Thomas 
K. Clancy, What Constitutes an “Arrest” Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 48 VILL. 
L. REV. 129 (2003) (analyzing the differences between arrests and other type of detentions).  
34. Roz Plater, As Many as 50 Percent of People with COVID-19 Aren’t Aware They Have the 
Virus, HEALTHLINE (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/50-percent-of-people-
with-COVID19-not-aware-have-virus [https://perma.cc/443W-FAZA]; Aylin Woodward, It’s 
Estimated 1 in 4 Coronavirus Carriers Could Be Asymptomatic. Here’s What We Know, SCIENCE 
ALERT (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.sciencealert.com/here-s-what-we-know-so-far-about-those-who-
can-pass-corona-without-symptoms [https://perma.cc/QMY7-JXAZ]. 
35. Carl Heneghan, Jon Brassey, & Tom Jefferson, COVID-19: What Proportion Are
Asymptomatic?, CEBM (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.cebm.net/COVID-19/COVID-19-what-
proportion-are-asymptomatic/ [https://perma.cc/8WWP-QSW5]. 
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Given that so many people may be infected with the novel 
coronavirus and be completely asymptomatic, it may be “reasonable” to 
assume that everyone could be infected with it. Indeed, public health 
officials like Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation President Stephen 
Prescott have warned people to “[a]ssume you’re contagious, even if you 
feel fine.”36 Put differently, there might be reasonable suspicion to justify 
stops of all persons who are outside their homes when SaHOs/SiPOs are 
in effect. Such an approach is arguably consistent with Terry v. Ohio, 
provided that the stop is brief and limited in scope to investigating whether 
a person is in transit for a permitted purpose, such as for medical reasons, 
to buy groceries, and to work in essential services.37 Admittedly, this 
interpretation of Terry would expand law enforcement authority in ways 
that significantly encroach on Fourth Amendment liberties. To prevent 
what economist Robert Higgs refers to as a “ratchet effect” to explain 
expanding governmental authority during crises in ways that not only 
exceed preexisting norms,38 but also tend to remain as the “new normal” 
after the crisis subsides,39 SaHOs/SiPOs should be justified using Fourth 
Amendment doctrines other than trying to fit such enforcement within the 
Terry framework. Indeed, there are a number of doctrines that may justify 
suspicionless stops from a constitutional perspective. 
B. Exigent Circumstances 
A narrow range of circumstances that permit warrantless searches 
and seizures for criminal investigatory purposes, such as to prevent the 
imminent destruction of evidence or to apprehend a dangerous fleeing 
felon during hot pursuit.40 But true emergencies can also justify actions 
36. K. Butcher, “Assume you’re contagious, even if you feel fine,” Health experts urging
Oklahomans to be cautious for sake of others, KFOR.COM (Mar. 19, 2020), https://kfor.com/health/
coronavirus/assume-youre-contagious-even-if-you-feel-fine-health-experts-urging-oklahomans-to-
be-cautious-for-sake-of-others/ [https://perma.cc/R3Q2-DDJG]. 
37. California Executive Order N-33-20. (Mar. 19, 2020), https://COVID19.ca.gov/
img/Executive-Order-N-33-20.pdf. [https://perma.cc/A6HN-D77Z]. 
38. ROBERT HIGGS, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CRISIS OPPORTUNISM 3–4 (Mercatus Pol’y 
Series Primer No. 11, 2009), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Mercatus_Policy_Series-
HIGGS.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW2M-CXNB]. 
39. E.g., David S. Damato, Civil liberties under attack during COVID-19, THE HILL (Apr. 8,
2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/491731-civil-liberties-under-attack-during-COVID-19 
[https://perma.cc/X8T5-P3XQ]; David French, Lata Nott, & Jeffrey Rosen, Civil Liberties and 
COVID-19, WE THE PEOPLE PODCAST (Apr. 2, 2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/podcast/civil-liberties-and-COVID-19 [https://perma.cc/8NNL-DDQV]. 
40. JOHN N. FERDICO, HENRY F. FRADELLA, & CHRISTOPHER D. TOTTEN, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONAL 254–57 (12th ed. 2015); see also Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1984). 
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that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment in response to threats 
to safety. For example, first responders are permitted to enter a burning 
building to fight the fire and rescue persons who may be trapped inside.41 
Police may forcibly enter a private home without a warrant in response to 
situations “when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need 
of immediate aid.”42 And although the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
administrative searches by municipal health and safety inspectors 
constitute significant intrusions upon interests protected by Fourth 
Amendment and, therefore, require a warrant, the Court was careful to say 
that exigent circumstances such as the seizure of tainted food, preventing 
exposure to smallpox, and destroying tubercular cattle would allow 
warrantless entry for an emergency inspection.43 
Lower courts have expanded the exigent circumstances exception in 
threats to safety context to a variety of circumstances including 
responding to calls for emergency medical treatment, searching for 
missing persons (especially in response to reported kidnappings), 
stopping an assault or burglary in progress, responding to gunfire, and 
responding to information concerning the whereabouts of an explosive 
device or volatile chemicals.44 In such contexts, aiding people in 
objectively reasonable emergency situations distinguishes such actions 
from warrantless stops, entries, and searches conducted law 
enforcement/criminal investigatory purposes. 
The COVID-19 pandemic no doubt presents exigent circumstances 
on a social level. But whether people being outside their home after the 
issuance of SaHOs/SiPOs, however, qualifies as an exigent circumstance 
for Fourth Amendment purposes is doubtful. It is unlikely that courts 
would find the exigent circumstances exception applicable in the 
contagious disease context for at least three reasons. First, courts tend to 
interpret the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment 
quite narrowly.45 Second, other than situations in which police, 
firefighters, and paramedics are responding to calls for emergency 
medical treatment, courts generally require police to have probable cause 
that some underlying criminal activity is transpiring when applying the 
41. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978). 
42. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). 
43. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967). 
44. For a review, see John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and
Fourth Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433 (1999). 
45. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749–50 (“Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that 
exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number and carefully delineated,’ . . . .”); see also 
Decker, supra note 44. 
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exigent circumstances doctrine.46 Indeed, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, the 
Supreme Court specifically noted its “hesitation in finding exigent 
circumstances” even when probable cause existed to arrest someone for a 
relative minor offense.47 Thus, whether the doctrine would ultimately be 
held to justify stops made without any particularized suspicion seems 
dubious. Finally, even when violations of SaHOs/SiPOs constitute 
criminal offenses and, therefore, being out of the home might arguably 
establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause, unlike in many of the 
emergency situations previously discussed, the prevention of viral 
transmission presents a more speculative type of harm than those 
presented by burning buildings, active gunfire, or assaults in progress. 
Accordingly, a different doctrine might be better suited to underpin the 
constitutionality of police stops to enforce SaHOs/SiPOs during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
C. Individuals in Transit 
A strong argument can be made that law enforcement officers are 
permitted to stop people while traveling in order to enforce public health 
orders. The clearest example of such authority is at international borders 
or their functional equivalents, such as international airline terminals, 
cruise ship terminals, or some other place where someone may be stopped 
for the first time upon entering the country. “Border searches are not only 
a part of maintaining the sovereignty of the country by controlling the 
flow of both people and articles into or out of the country but also play a 
vital role in maintaining national security.”48 As a result, “routine searches 
of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement 
of reasonable suspicion . . . .”49 
Of course, the reasons supporting suspicionless searches at 
international borders is not directly applicable when police stop persons 
on foot, bicycles, or in cars already within the United States. Federal 
regulations specifically authorize the “apprehension” of people if the 
“individual is reasonably believed to be infected with a quarantinable 
communicable disease” when such person is moving between states.50 But 
just because someone is moving across state lines does not give law 
enforcement reasonable grounds to believe that the person is infected. 
46. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750. 
47. Id. 
48. FERDICO ET AL., supra note 40, at 232. 
49. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (quoting United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)). 
50. 42 C.F.R. § 70.6(A)(1) (2020). 
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Thus, a different legal doctrine that is not dependent on particularized, 
reasonable suspicion may be needed to justify such actions when people 
are engaged in interstate travel. Moreover, that doctrine would also need 
to apply to stops of persons engaged in travel within a state or locality. 
The special needs doctrine seems best suited for such circumstances. 
D. Special Needs 
There are certain types of searches that, when conducted for a special 
need unrelated to the detection of criminal activity, not only excuse the 
usual requirement of a warrant, but also can occur without probable cause. 
Under the special needs doctrine, such searches are evaluated under the 
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. The applicability of 
this exception to normal Fourth Amendment standards depending on 
whether there is a “special need that involves a real and significant 
problem ‘beyond the normal need for law enforcement’ to detect crime.”51 
Under this doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned searches of 
public employees’ workspaces by their supervisors to detect work-related 
misconduct;52 random drug testing of certain types of governmental 
employees to promote public safety;53 and searches of persons entering 
correctional institutions to prevent the entry of contraband.54 
Importantly, the Supreme Court has even relied on the special needs 
doctrine to allow searches and seizures that are not even supported by 
reasonable suspicion, the reduced level of proof that is normally required 
to conduct a stop-and-frisk pursuant to Terry v. Ohio and its progeny.55 
51. FERDICO ET AL., supra note 40, at 218; see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313
(1997). 
52. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 
757 (2010) (reasoning that when a public employee “has a legitimate privacy expectation, an 
employer’s intrusion on that expectation ‘for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for 
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under 
all the circumstances.’”) (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725–26). 
53. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671–72 (1989) (holding that 
the drug testing of armed law enforcement agents involved in drug interdiction efforts presents a 
special need that justifies suspicionless urinalyses); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (“The Government’s interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to 
ensure safety, like its supervision of probationers or regulated industries, or its operation of a 
government office, school, or prison, ‘likewise presents “special needs” beyond normal law 
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.’”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
54. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 330–
40 (2012) (reasoning that correctional security needs justify searches of arrestees for whom there is 
no reasonable suspicion of possession of concealed weapon or other contraband). 
55. See WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 26, at 43–79. 
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For example, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,56 the Court 
upheld a program that established roadside sobriety checkpoints without 
a warrant or any particularized suspicion. “Key to the Court’s reasoning 
was the fact that a significant public safety need met by these motor 
vehicle stops outweighed the minimal intrusions such stops caused to 
drivers’ privacy rights.”57 The Court also upheld mandatory drug testing 
of student athletes in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,58 finding no 
violation of students’ Fourth Amendment rights in spite of the 
suspicionless nature of such testing because it served the goal of 
preventing teenage drug use. The Court even extended this line of 
reasoning in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 v. 
Earls to permit the random, suspicionless drug testing of all students who 
engaged extracurricular after-school activities.59 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never confronted the issue of police 
authority to conduct suspicionless stops in the context of disease 
prevention. But in light of the aforementioned rulings applying the special 
needs doctrine, there is high likelihood that the compelling public health 
goal of preventing of the spread of a potentially lethal contagious disease 
would qualify as a special need justifying warrantless and suspicionless 
stops of people who are “out and about” when SaHOs/SiPOs are in effect. 
Still, to comply with the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers 
need to execute such stops reasonably. 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of concerns about the Ebola virus, the United States took 
steps to update many public health protocols, especially those concerning 
isolation and quarantine. In reviewing the substantive and procedural due 
process concerns raised by these laws and regulations, law and public 
health professors Michael R. Ulrich and Wendy K. Mariner wrote the 
following: 
There is no evidence that the public is reluctant to cooperate with public 
health officials, especially in the midst of an outbreak, as long as the 
public has confidence in official recommendations. But public officials 
must earn that trust. This requires public health officials to obtain accu-
rate information, communicate honestly with the public, and ensure that 
56. 496 U.S. 444, 454–55 (1990). 
57. FERDICO ET AL., supra note 40, at 221. 
58. 515 U.S. 646, 660–65 (1995). 
59. 536 U.S. 822, 830–32 (2002). 
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the public has the resources necessary to cooperate with reasonable rec-
ommendations.60 
Sadly, public trust in governmental communications during the COVID-
19 pandemic may be justifiably low in light of the conflicting information 
that citizens have received from public health officials, who sounded the 
alarm over the novel coronavirus, and President Trump, who repeatedly 
downplayed the severity of the outbreak.61 The confusion that results from 
such mixed messages compounds the difficulties that police face as first 
responders during an international health emergency. Thus, in addition to 
citizens voluntarily cooperating with SaHOs/SiPOs for their own good 
and that of their families and community members, it is essential that the 
messaging from federal authorities, ranging from the CDC to the White 
House, communicate accurate information. 
It is equally important that people be respectful of police at this 
difficult time. Law enforcement officers are on the front lines of the 
pandemic. Police put their lives on the line each day. As with other first 
responders, the current threats to police officers’ lives are particularly 
palpable since an invisible viral infection threatens their safety above and 
beyond those they face in ordinary times. Shortages of personal protective 
equipment compound the health dangers officers face right now. Rather 
than challenging police who stop pedestrians or drivers to inquire about 
compliance with SaHOs/SiPOs, people should do their best to thank 
officers who are looking out for our safety, health, and welfare during 
particularly challenging times. 
That being said, police must be careful to honor people’s 
constitutional rights during the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, this is a 
particularly important time for putting the best community policing 
strategies into practice. Officers need to communicate the importance of 
compliance with SaHOs/SiPOs, especially to people who may not 
understand how asymptomatic people can nonetheless transmit the novel 
coronavirus. 
Finally, criminal court personnel should consider the long-term 
consequences of challenging, defending, or upholding stops to investigate 
60. Ulrich & Mariner, supra note 4, at 429. 
61. Brad Brooks, Like the flu? Trump’s coronavirus messaging confuses public, pandemic
researchers say, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-
mixed-messages/like-the-flu-trumps-coronavirus-messaging-confuses-public-pandemic-researchers-
say-idUSKBN2102GY [https://perma.cc/6KNW-7FAT]; Intelbrief: COVID-19 Exposes Fault Lines 
in U.S. Public Trust and Government, THE SOUFAN CENTER (Apr. 3, 2020) 
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-COVID-19-exposes-fault-lines-in-u-s-public-trust-and-
government/ [https://perma.cc/24U5-595F]. 
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compliance with SaHOs/SiPOs using Fourth Amendment doctrines that 
have the potential to erode constitutional rights in the future. The special 
needs doctrine is the approach least likely to do so. Accordingly, that 
approach to upholding police enforcement of public health orders ought 
to be the preferred one during this time of pandemic. 
